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Abstract
This paper aims to assess the role of national and regional 
agencies in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
Southeast European (SEE) countries and to connect the find-
ings from IPA’s staff with the determinants of FDI inflows. The 
research is conducted using survey data and panel data anal-
ysis. The results indicate small, inadequate, and unexploited 
potential of investment promotion agencies (IPAs). They have 
participated in a small number of FDI projects and most of the 
FDIs came into the region without their participation. They do 
not have a qualitative approach to FDI. Most of the regional 
agencies (except in Croatia and Kosovo) do not even envisage 
cooperation with foreign investors. The panel data research 
has shown that GDP per capita, wages, inflation (as economic 
variables), but also enterprise restructuring, tax rates, trade 
and forex system (institutional variables) have influence on 
FDI inward stock.
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1 Introduction
Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) inflows can play an 
important role in the development and competitiveness of 
countries. The impact of FDI on growth is expected to be 
manifold and its influence depends on the sector orientation 
and kind of FDI (Damijan et al., 2013). Greenfield FDIs are 
considered to be more desirable for the host country because 
they point to new production, which leads to additional and 
new employment, brings new technologies, know-how, higher 
levels of efficiency, and productivity. This can have a positive 
impact on domestic firms, which can learn from them. FDIs 
are not always just positive as it depends on the development 
stage and characteristics of host countries, that is, because of 
the lack of competitiveness and export performance of domes-
tic firms, entry of foreign firms can destroy domestic economy 
(Mencinger, 2003).
Countries have conventionally been working to encourage 
the inflow of FDI because of the expected benefits of FDIs. 
They usually do this through a list of incentives given to foreign 
investors as defined in the laws for promoting investments (fis-
cal and financial incentives). Many countries have established 
specialized agencies as the push factor and information cor-
ner for investors. In the literature there are many determinants 
of FDI inflow such as: market size, market growth, barriers to 
trade, wages, production, transportation and other costs, politi-
cal stability, psychic distance, and host government’s trade and 
taxation regulations that affected location decisions (Dunning, 
1992; Dunning, 1993; Kinoshita and Campos, 2002; Markusen, 
1998; Markusen and Venables, 1998; Hunya, 2000; Brainard, 
1997; Blonigen, 2005). All these factors can be measured and 
are included in different econometric models. 
Existing researches have given less attention to investment 
promotion agencies (IPA). The IPAs are important because they 
are one-stop-shop points for foreign investors and their support 
(adequate information, knowledge, availability, professional-
ism, help) can be invaluable for attracting FDI inflows. These 
agencies do some kind of marketing of a country through the 
following technics: image building, investment generating, and 
investor services (Wells, 1999). IPAs are in close contact with 
1 Juraj Dobrila University of Pula, 
Faculty of Economics and Tourism “Dr. Mijo Mirković”
52100 Pula, P.Preradovica 1 Croatia
* Corresponding author, e-mail: ikersan@unipu.hr
23(1), pp. 15-24, 2015
DOI: 10.3311/PPso.7966
Creative Commons Attribution b
research article
P Periodica Polytechnica
Social and Management
Sciences
16 Period. Polytech. Soc. Man. Sci. I. Kersan-Škabić
foreign investors (providing services) and they obtain detailed 
knowledge about the problems that investors face. It enables 
the agencies to make or to propose necessary reforms (respon-
sible ministries usually do not have such kind of concrete infor-
mation). Although there is no clear evidence and proof of effec-
tiveness of IPAs, governments continue to increase expenditure 
on investment promotion because many national and subna-
tional governments view foreign investments as a precondition 
for economic development.
Wells and Wint (1990) conducted the earliest study on the 
effect of IPAs on FDI flows and they have found that investment 
promotion is significantly correlated with the level of FDI per 
capita in a sample of 50 countries. Cass (2006) used an assess-
ment-based approach to determine the extent and intensity of 
IPA activities, concentrating on the three “classical” IPA tasks: 
Investor Services, Image Building, and Investor Generation. 
On the basis of analysis made in 27 countries, he points that 
the establishment and development of IPAs have been influ-
enced by active participation in international competition for 
export-oriented investment linked to progress in transition. He 
also warns that incentives are important in the early stage of 
liberalization (transition), but Wells (1999) shows their impor-
tance at three phases: pre-investment decision, implementation 
of investment, and post-investment stage.
According to data from The World Association of Investment 
Promotion Agencies (WAIPA), the Association counted 165 
member agencies from 122 countries. IPAs refer to differ-
ent agencies, government body, or other entity on national or 
regional level whose prime function is to promote any country 
as a destination for or as source of investments (WAIPA, 2012).
The goal of this paper is to focus on the role of IPAs in the 
Southeast European (SEE) countries in attracting FDI inflows. 
There are different ways of assessing the role and scope of IPAs 
(their role in investment process, their budget, staff, and respon-
sibilities). We wanted to determine the contribution of IPAs to 
the FDI inflows as they most often provided information to for-
eign investors, their attitudes on: the reasons for investment in 
a particular area (country/region), benefits and disadvantages 
of FDI, and obstacles and unfavourable effects of inward FDI. 
We will confront their attitudes with the result of economet-
ric analysis pointing the role of selected institutional variables. 
Additionally, we want to determine the qualitative aspect of 
IPAs (according to the country’s strategies) that is, their focus 
to attract investment in particular sectors (through reliefs and 
specialized staff). The research is done using survey data and 
panel data analysis. 
The contribution of this paper is the focus on the specific 
geographical region, which has not been studied separately. 
There are few studies where some of the SEE countries were 
included. An UNCTAD study (UNCTAD, 2001) of IPAs 
worldwide included aggregated data on 15 agencies in Central 
and Eastern Europe (covering activities, resources, priorities, 
issues, and organization). Morisset and Andrews-Johnson 
(2004) included nine transition countries in their survey of 
the effectiveness of IPAs but reported only aggregate findings. 
Kunčič and Svetličič (2011) have included in the analysis a 
few SEE countries. This paper aims to include the following 
countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. As most of these for-
mer socialist countries were affected by war in the first half 
of 1990s, they began the process of liberalization later than 
countries in Central and East Europe (CEE). These countries 
also faced a weak institutional development (with the trend of 
improvement) where IPAs are a part of institutional infrastruc-
ture. The first wave of FDI inflows was oriented toward buy-
ing the ownership share in the existing firms through so-called 
brownfield FDI (privatization process). As usual, there was 
also the competition arising among countries in attracting FDIs 
through different incentives (tax holidays and reliefs) proposed 
by their governments. Initially, countries wanted to receive 
many FDIs with no or limited care about which sectors those 
investments were targeted. Only two countries from the region 
(Croatia and Montenegro) have attracted significant levels of 
FDI per capita (EUR 5,787 and 6,500, respectively), whereas 
the rest of the SEE region suffers from low attractiveness. With 
time, all SEE countries have started to build their country’s 
images (relatively late in comparison with CEE countries) and 
have established special agencies for promoting countries and 
for providing services to foreigners who want to invest. The 
role of IPAs is to overcome market imperfections and informa-
tion asymmetries and ensure information availability and dis-
semination to foreign investors.
The paper is organized as follows: the following section pre-
sents the literature review, the third section describes the data, 
the methodology of research and presents the results and the 
final section gives the concluding remarks.
2 Literature review
Establishing an IPA has become the most popular institu-
tional approach in strategic FDI promotion across nations and 
regions worldwide (OECD, 2006). The general purpose of 
IPAs is to increase the international visibility of the country 
(or region) through marketing campaigns and to facilitate the 
investment process by offering tailored services and incentives 
to foreign corporations, both before and after the initial invest-
ment (Guimon and Filippov, 2012). The overview of IPAs tasks 
is given in Table 1.
Usually, the activities of IPAs are focused on boosting 
inflows of FDI via a quantitative approach because these 
investments should promote increase of production and 
generate new employment. As the quantity of FDI inflows 
grow in a country (particularly in developed countries), they 
gradually attract more qualitative FDIs, which contribute 
significantly to the national and regional competitiveness.
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Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) explain this new trend as a 
race to the top (competition in asset creation) as opposed to 
the classical race to the bottom (competition based on lower 
costs and taxes). Kemeny (2010) warns that such a positive 
evolution is not automatic and it is necessary to raise local 
capabilities and absorptive capacity. Regarding the differences 
between quantitative and qualitative FDIs there are also differ-
ences in the measurement of their effectiveness. 
Table 1 Functions of IPAs
Function Description Example of means
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Investor 
facilitation and 
investor services
Assisting an investor 
to analyze his 
decision, establish a 
business and ensure it 
continues to operate
Provision of 
information, 
assistance in getting 
approvals, assistance 
with sites, utilities, 
etc.
Image building
Creating the 
perception of a 
country as an 
attractive site
Advertising and 
public relations
Investment 
generation
Targeting specific 
sectors and 
companies in order 
to create investment 
leads
Identification of 
targets, direct 
contact, forums, 
seminars, etc.
Po
lic
y-
re
la
te
d 
ac
tiv
iti
es
Policy advocacy
Supporting initiatives 
to improve the 
investment climate 
and identifying 
private sector views.
Surveys, 
participation in 
task forces, policy 
proposals, lobbying.
Source: Cass (2006), Morisset and Andrews-Johnson (2004).
Evaluation of IPAs is very complex and in an optimal case, 
it will include external (funder, national government, interna-
tional organization) and internal dimensions (staff characteris-
tics, financing, number of projects,…) (UNCTAD, 2008).
Raines and Wishlade (1999) warn that there is competition 
not only among countries but also among regions within coun-
tries. Hughes and Helinska-Hughes (2002) have presented 
case studies of four countries and find that the core services 
of IPAs in all agencies are the same and the difference is that 
IPAs in developed (West European) countries have adopted 
a more proactive stance with direct contacts to individual 
firms. It is not clear if such behaviour reflects a more sophis-
ticated and effective approach, or the availability of more 
resources, or perhaps just a measure of despair. There is also 
evidence of an increase in the number of institutions at the 
national and regional levels in the observed four countries 
that act in attracting FDIs but they are loosely coordinated.
Morisset (2003) used data from a survey of 58 countries and 
shows that greater investment promotion is associated with 
higher cross-country FDI flows. The effectiveness of IPAs 
depends on: the country’s environment in which it operates, 
scope of activities that an agency undertakes influences its per-
formance, and certain internal characteristics of the agencies.
Charlton and Davies (2007) researched if the existence of 
IPAs increased the inflows of FDI, that is, if the IPAs have jus-
tified their establishment and financing from the government 
budget. They found a positive effect of investment promotion 
in terms of robust FDI inflows across various empirical specifi-
cations. IPAs focusing on small number of sectors have proven 
to be a very good policy because such a targeting increases FDI 
inflows in that industry by 41%. 
Guimon (2009) focused his research on the necessary activities 
of IPAs to attract more qualitative FDIs (in research and develop-
ment sector) in Spain and Ireland and conclude that it is necessary 
to encourage close cooperation between IPAs and innovation pol-
icy in a country because they are two policy areas that have tra-
ditionally operated separately. It is also recommended that IPAs 
targeting R&D-intensive FDI to reconfigure the scope of services 
they provide by placing more emphasis on aftercare, as R&D-
intensive FDI tends to be evolutionary rather than purely green-
field. Guimon and Filippov (2012) point that shifting emphasis 
from quantity to quality in FDI promotion entails a new policy 
mix and a new approach to performance evaluation. They offer a 
broad framework to better guide FDI policy reform considering 
the interaction between the IPAs targeting quality from an intel-
lectual capital management perspective.
Deichmann (2010) and Kunčić and Svetličić (2011) have 
analysed the attitudes of the employees in IPAs or other pro-
moting agencies because they also influence, shape, and imple-
ment the policies for FDI. Although Deichman’s research was 
focused on the Czech Republic, Kunčić and Svetličič (2011) 
have applied a survey approach and cluster analysis to deter-
mine the effectiveness of FDI IPAs in Europe and the Western 
Balkans. The results are profiled in three sets of beliefs or atti-
tudes toward FDI: “pessimistic,” “Keynesian,” and “neoclassi-
cal.” Keynesians largely favour fiscal measures for attracting 
FDI, whereas neoclassical dislike fiscal measures and govern-
ment interventions and prefer good economic fundamentals, 
infrastructure, and qualified personnel. Most of the Eastern 
European Union as well as South-eastern European respond-
ents can be classified as Keynesians.
Šymelite (2012) found that investment promotion has a 
strong effect on FDI on condition that investment promotion is 
introduced in full in the Baltic states. 
As Lim (2008) points out, it is necessary to decide if we 
should look at the IPA as a determinant of FDI inflows or medi-
ator for FDI attractiveness between the host country’s environ-
ment and FDI inflows. An IPA’s (promotion) activity has been 
considered as a part of business facilitation (UNCTAD, 1998), 
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but it is not clearly argued as to how an IPA’s activity affects 
FDI inflows. Our approach is in line with Lim (2008) because 
of a few reasons: the IPAs in the SEE region have existed for a 
relatively short period; they do not create business environment 
(they can help to explain it and make it closer to investors); 
they are very small in terms of number of employees, and, as 
most of them do not have a specific budget for FDI activities, 
they cannot be considered as a determinant for FDI inflows 
(there are other market and resource-seeking determinants of 
FDI). The IPAs are a part of institutional infrastructure.
3 Empirical research
3.1 Data and methodology
The analysis of IPAs role in attracting of FDI was conducted 
on the seven SEE countries1. The research consists of two parts: 
survey analysis (1) and panel data analysis (2).
(1) Survey analysis
The sample of agencies includes national agencies for FDI 
promoting and regional development agencies. All observed 
countries have national agencies for FDI promoting2. On the 
regional level the number, organization, and responsibilities 
of agencies differs not only among countries but also among 
regions in the same country. Among the observed countries, 
only Croatia is in the EU membership that can give positive 
impact on its institutions and activities of agencies. There are 
21 accredited regional agencies (or similar bodies) in Croatia 
that primarily focuses on promoting regional development, 
entrepreneurship, and absorption of the EU funds. Serbia has 10 
regional accredited agencies that are focused to provide support 
to local businesses and local municipalities in the creation of 
local development/infrastructure plans. There are four regional 
development agencies in Kosovo (North, East, South, and 
West), and for Albania we cannot determine the exact number 
of regional agencies. In Macedonia, there are three institutions 
in charge of promoting local development, whereas in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina there are five regional agencies. Although 
Montenegro has two regional bodies, they are not responsible 
for communication with foreign investors; the entire promoting 
activities are executed at the national level (national agency 
for investment promoting). It is also important to mention the 
establishment of SEENORDA (South East Europe Network of 
Regional Development Agencies) as a network of 19 regional 
development agencies in Macedonia, Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Turkey, Albania, and Montenegro.
We are focused on the assessing the scope of activities, 
services provided to investors, and qualitative aspect of IPAs. 
Initial assumption is that IPAs deal as a mediator between the 
host country environment and foreign investors (and they com-
pensate for market failures) (Lim, 2008).
The research was conducted by survey, which was sent to 
77 institutions (national agencies, regional agencies, chambers 
of commerce, or similar institutions that may deal with for-
eign investors). The questionnaire consisted of 33 questions, 
both qualitative and quantitative. In the first part of survey, the 
respondents had to answer on general questions about the name, 
year of establishment, number of employees, educational struc-
ture of employees, and so on. The second part of the survey 
pertains to their role (services, activities) in attracting FDI. The 
survey consists of 16 multiple choice questions, six “yes/no” 
questions with possibilities for explanations, two questions are 
graded according to Likert scale, four questions are rankings, 
and the rest are “open” type questions3. The questionnaire was 
sent to the target group on February 10, 2014, and the time for 
responding was until the end of February (with one reminder). 
(2) Panel data analysis
In the second part of research we have proceed with the 
econometric analysis of determinants of FDI putting in the 
model specific variables that IPA’s staff has been recognized as 
the main reasons (and information provided to foreign inves-
tors) and obstacles for attraction more FDI. There are many 
researches of determinants of FDI and the idea here is not just 
making another research on a particular group of countries. 
The aim is to indicate if the IPA staff, which communicate with 
foreign investors, have right opinion and impression about the 
main shortages in their economies which should be improved 
if the countries want to be more attractive and reliable host 
economies for foreign investments.
The detected obstacles are in area of institutional develop-
ment, which has been researched by La Porta et al. (1999), 
Egger & Winner (2005), Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2004), 
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007). The dependent variable in our 
models will be FDI inward stock and independent variables: 
GDP per capita, inflation, wages, corporate tax rates, and insti-
tutional variables. The data for GDP per capita, FDI inward 
stock, inflation and wages are from WIIW (2013) while the 
main sources for institutional variables are: the EBRD transition 
indicators, Economic Freedom data (The Heritage Foundation), 
and Transparency International.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
publishes the Transition Report, in which it processes many 
3 Some of the questions follow the questionnaire of Kunčić and Svetličić 
(2011).
1 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia.
2 For example: Agency for invesments and competitiveness (Croatia), 
Foreign Investment Promotion Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Serbia 
Investment and Export Promotion Agency, Agency for Foreign Investments, 
and Export Promotion of the Republic of Macedonia, etc. The situation in 
Croatia is strange because there was the (national) Agency for promoting 
export and investments until the end of 2011 and later a new agency (Agency 
for investments and competitiveness) was established with the new staff and 
organizational structure, which is not transparent and not good policy for the 
cooperation with potential investors from abroad.
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indicators to assess improvements in restructuring of econo-
mies. The scores are from 1 to 4+, and are based on an assess-
ment of the size of challenges in terms of two components: 
market structure and market-supporting institutions and poli-
cies. They measure the transition gap (deviation from efficient 
market structure). Score 1 to 2 means that there is a large tran-
sition gap, and score 4 or 4+ means that this gap is negligible. 
The expected influence of the EBRD indicators on FDI inflows 
is positive (EBRD, 2014).
The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation pub-
lish the Index of Economic Freedom that covers 10 freedoms 
grouped into four broad categories: rule of law, limited govern-
ment, regulatory efficiency and open markets. Each of these 
freedoms is scored on a scale of 1 to 100, where 100 represent 
the maximum freedom.
Transparency International measures levels of corruption in 
the public sector, and assesses the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI). It is a composite index, a combination of polls, drawing 
on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable 
institutions. A scale of  0 – 100 is applied to measure the percep-
tion of corruption, where 0 means that a country is perceived as 
highly corrupt and 100 means that a country is perceived as not 
corrupt. The expected impact of the CPI on FDI inward stock is 
positive (a higher score means less corruption). 
The model will include the following institutional vari-
ables: EBRD transition indicators (enterprise restructuring, 
trade and forex systems), property rights freedom from the 
Heritage Foundation, and the corruption perception index 
from Transparency International. The data set covers the 
period 2000-2012.
The relationship between FDI inward stock and their deter-
minants is as follows:
FDI inwardstockit= α + β1 GDP per capitait + β2 wagesit + β3 
inflationit + β4 Xit + εit    i=1...N; t=1...T
Where the dependent variable is FDI inward stock and the 
independent variables are: GDP per capita, inflation, wages, and 
institutional variables: enterprise restructuring, corruption per-
ception index, property rights freedom, trade and forex systems.
Considering that the sample has a cross-sectional dimen-
sion, represented by countries (i = 1; : : : ;N) and a longitudinal 
dimension, represented by a time series (t = 1; : : : ; T periods), 
the panel data method will be used (Hsiao, 2003). We included 
in the analysis all observed countries except Kosovo due to 
lack of data. The sample comprises unbalanced panel data, i.e. 
there are some time periods missing from some units in the 
population of interest.
We used random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) estima-
tion methods, which allow us to deal with the problem of unob-
served heterogeneity. All models are tested using the Hausman 
test to decide between RE and FE and standard errors that are 
robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The use of 
fixed effects is most certainly warranted. 
The dependent variable and control variables (FDI inward 
stock, GDP per capita, inflation, wages, tax rates) were logged 
to interpret the coefficient as elasticities. Furthermore, taking 
logs enabled us to scale down the variation in data and generate 
better results in terms of statistical significance and standard 
errors. The institutional variables are constructed as indices and 
therefore are not logged. All models are corrected for autocor-
relation and heteroscedasticity by using cluster robust standard 
errors. The results are presented in Table 7.
3.2 Results
The total number of respondents was 37; however, all 
respondents did not answer all questions (some questions are 
not obliged to be completed). Among these institutions, 18 of 
them are not involved in the operations with foreign inves-
tors or did not complete the survey correctly and therefore 
excluded. Finally, we were left with 19 respondents of which 
29.7% deal at the national level and 70.3% at the regional level. 
Most of the respondents come from Croatia (59%), 27% come 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11% from Kosovo, and 1.5% 
from Serbia and Macedonia. We did not receive any answer 
from Albania and Montenegro.
18
19
Not involved
Do business with foreign 
investors
Fig. 1 Number of agencies/institutions that are/are not involve in the 
cooperation with foreign investors.
(Source: author’s calculation based on survey’s results.)
29,7
70,3
National level
Regional level
Fig. 2 IPA- national or regional level (in %)
(Source: author’s calculation based on survey’s results.)
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59
27
11
1,5
1,5
0 20 40 60 80
Croaa
B&H
Kosovo
Serbia
Macedonia
Fig. 3 IPA structure by countries (in %)
(Source: author’s calculation based on survey’s results.)
Next, we are going to present and comment on the results of 
specific important questions. Most of the agencies are young–
they were established between 1999 and 2013 (most of them 
was established after 2005). Number of employees who work 
with foreign investors is very small (in 13 cases it is in the 
range 0–3) and only in 6 cases there are more than 10 people 
available to foreign partners. The employees are predominantly 
highly educated (70%) with the average monthly net salary 
higher than 500 euro (53% of respondents).
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0-3
more than 10
Fig. 4 Number of employees in charge to work with foreign investors
(Source: author’s calculation based on survey’s results.)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
less than 20%
21-50%
51-70%
more than 71%
no answer
Fig. 5 Estimation of the intermediation role of IPA in FDI inflows in a 
particular region/country
On the question about the annual budget for FDI promotion, 
we obtained only nine answers of which only three IPAs gave 
concrete data. This is very disappointing because this limits 
their activities and possibilities to capture a more active posi-
tion in the area of cooperation with foreign investors. 
27% of respondents estimate their intermediation in less 
than 20% of total FDI in a particular country/region; 16% of 
them estimate that they have participated in 21-50% of invest-
ment projects; 5.4% think their share is 51-70%, and no agency 
has participated in more than 71% of investment projects in 
particular country/region (10.8% of respondents did not give 
answer on this question). Most of the IPAs continue to cooper-
ate with foreign investors in post-investment stage (81%).
Tables 2-6 shows the attitudes of IPA’s staff about: informa-
tion/service provided to foreign investors (Table 2); the main 
obstacles for realization of investment in a particular coun-
try/region (Table 3); the main benefits of FDI in a particular 
country/region (Table 4); disadvantages from FDI in a particu-
lar country/region (Table 5) and the reasons for unfavourable 
effects of FDI (Table 6).
Table 2 Information/services provided to foreign investors by IPA (average rank)
Information about: Rank
tax system in your country 3.13
infrastructure development 3.09
procedure of establishment of firm 3.5
reliefs for foreign investors 4.27
specific locality in your country/region 4
legal system 4.91
educational structure in a particular region/city 5.09
Source: author’s calculation based on survey’s results.
The respondents should rank the answers where
the 1 represents the most important rank.
The numbers in figures are average ranks where the low-
est rank shows the higher importance. The most often required 
information was about the infrastructure development, the tax 
system, and the procedure of establishment of the firm. These 
are the basic information for bring a decision of investment 
locality and for starting a business.
Table 3 The main obstacles for realization of investment in a particular 
country/region
Rank
institutional development 3.75
tax policy 4.1
macroeconomic stability 3.25
infrastructure development 3.55
corruption 3
administration and justice 3.35
Source: author’s calculation based on survey’s results.
The respondents should rank the answers where
the 1 represents the most important rank.
The IPA’s staff recognized corruption, macroeconomic (in)
stability, and administration and justice as the most important 
obstacles for FDI presence.
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Inflows of foreign capital are contributing to: transfer of 
technology, inflows of necessary capital (financial resources), 
and access to new markets. FDIs are not just a positive feature 
and the most important disadvantages from FDI inflows are: 
demands on government subsidies, crowding out local investors, 
reduced R&D activities, and negative impact on employment.
These disadvantages resulted in the first place from unfa-
vourable economic conditions and legal structure in a country.
The qualitative aspects of FDI has also been analysed where 
the respondents had to answer about the reliefs for investments 
in the specific sectors, point the specific sectors, and answer 
about employees specialized for particular industries sectors. 
The main findings are:
• only 3 IPAs have defined budget for the activities with 
foreign investors,
• only 5 IPAs say that the country/region has some special 
reliefs for investments in some specific sectors,
• 24% of IPAs have targeted specific industry, that is, 
respondents state the specific sectors. According to their 
answers the five most important sectors are: wood indus-
try, food production, agriculture; computer industry and 
automotive industry.4
We can classify the agencies in the SEE region as “Keynesian” 
according to Kunčić and Svetličić (2011) because the govern-
ment subsidies (fiscal relief) are the main factor of attractive-
ness for FDI according to the IPAs staff opinion based on their 
experience and communication with foreign investors.
The results of panel data analysis are presented in Table 7. 
The first model includes the economic location determi-
nants of a particular market: GDP per capita, inflation, wages, 
corporate tax rates and corruption perception index. GDP per 
capita is used as a proxy for purchasing power in the host coun-
try, inflation as a proxy for price stability, and wages reflect the 
labour costs to which the efficiency type of FDI is very sensi-
tive. Tax rates regard corporate tax rate and they are indicator 
of tax burden in the economy. GDP per capita, wages and tax 
rates have significant impact, where the impact of GDP p.c. has 
the expected sign, while wages and tax rates have positive sign 
and we would expect negative sign (more FDI if the wages and 
tax rates decrease). The reason can be that the highest level 
of FDI inward stock was recorded in Croatia which has the 
highest wages and also the highest level of corporate tax rate. 
Model 2 includes property rights freedom but this variable is 
not significant. The Model 3 incorporates enterprise restruc-
turing and model 4 includes reforms in trade and exchange 
rate policies where both variables are significant. The variable 
inflation is significant only in Model 3 whit expected negative 
influence on FDI inward stock.
The results are in line with the IPA’s staff opinion where 
they indicate high rank to providing information about tax sys-
tem to foreign investors. Corruption, as recognized problem 
by IPA’s staff, in the Model 1 doesn’t have significant impact 
on FDI inward stock, but macroeconomic stability (inflation, 
enterprise restructuring; trade and forex system) is important 
for FDI attractiveness.
4 The ranking of industries are not the same among the respondents.
Table 4 The main benefits of FDI in a particular country/region
Rank
inflows of capital 2.8
transfer of technology 2.67
access to new markets 3.04
new employment opportunities 4.09
improved competition at domestic market 4.61
improvement of management performance 3.76
Source: author’s calculation based on survey’s results.
The respondents should rank the answers where
the 1 represents the most important rank.
Table 5 Disadvantages from FDI inflows in a particular country/region
Rank
crowding out local investors/firms 3.9
reduced research and development activities 4.15
increased unemployment 4.6
excessive dependence on foreign investor’s decisions 4.75
increased dependence on selected export markets 5.25
increased dependence on foreign instead of local suppliers 5.2
reduced competition on the domestic market 4.55
demands on government subsidies 3.74
Source: author’s calculation based on survey’s results.
The respondents should rank the answers where
the 1 represents the most important rank.
Table 6 The reasons for unfavourable impact of FDI
Rank
unfavorable general economic conditions 2.94
lack of consistent legal and policy environment attracts only 
investors with speculative motivation
3.16
our regulatory framework and implementation policies did not 
provide effective protection of the interests of our economy
4.11
due to our poor negotiation skills, unfavorable conditions 
were accepted, and foreign owners do not care when hurting 
our economic interests
4.16
inadequate local competition policy 4.94
lack of local suppliers 4.42
excessive technology gap prevent more absorption of foreign 
knowledge
4.26
Source: author’s calculation based on survey’s results.
The respondents should rank the answers where
the 1 represents the most important rank.
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4 Conclusion
The idea of this research is to determine the importance of 
FDI promotion agencies in attracting FDI in the South and East 
Europe countries. The research is done by analysing primary 
data obtained from the survey responses and by regression anal-
ysis. The hypothesis was that agencies (at national or regional 
level) have close contact with foreign investors and they can 
recognize the kind of information the investors required from 
them, the benefits and disadvantages from FDI inflows, the fac-
tor of attractiveness (reasons for FDI inflow) and also obstacles 
and unfavourable effect of FDI inflow in a particular country/
region. The fact is that as a large number of regional agencies 
in the SEE countries really do not work with foreign inves-
tors, investors need to contact national agencies. The situation 
is different in Croatia and Kosovo where regional agencies also 
participate in investment process. IPAs in the SEE region are 
young–they were established between 1999 and 2013 (most of 
them was established after 2005). 
In the quantitative part of the research we have performed 
panel data analysis to find out the main determinants of FDI 
inward stock in the SEE countries including economic and 
institutional variables. The models show that GDP per capita, 
wages, inflation and tax rates have influence on FDI inward 
stock, but also enterprise restructuring and trade and forex sys-
tem, as institutional variables.
The general findings show that the national and regional agen-
cies role in attracting FDI is underutilized, especially with regard 
to regional agencies where in most countries they have played 
a very limited role or they do not have a role to cooperate with 
foreign investors. They are involved in a very small share of total 
FDI inflows in their countries, and usually they have no defined 
specific budget for FDI-promoting activities. Probably the foreign 
investors have found their own ways for penetrating the markets 
in SEE countries–maybe through the consultation firms or their 
chamber of commerce’s/branches they have in the SEE countries. 
The IPAs at national and regional level should have a more 
important role in cooperation with foreign investors; a more 
proactive approach in required with a lot of particular infor-
mation on possibilities of investments and also with empha-
sized sectors of specific interests. It should be in line with 
the national policies for attracting FDI (laws, strategic goals, 
increasing competitiveness).
The results obtained from this research provide an important 
review of IPAs and their effectiveness in attracting FDI in the 
SEE region. This review can be useful for policymakers at differ-
ent levels to define and focus the IPAs toward foreign investors 
Table 7 Determinants of FDI inward stock in Southeast European countries in period 2000-2012
Model 1- FE Model 2-FE Model 3-FE Model 4 -FE
GDP p.c.
1.517411
(0.2597628)**
1.083594
(0.4757307)
1.905774
(1.898528)
2.330225
(1.355271)
Wages
1.78299
(0.3419058)**
2.604246
(0.5578249)**
1.133224
(1.56135)
1.149762
(1.332)
Inflation
-0.0464015
(0.0413555)
-0.0835105
(0.0570484)
-0.207206
(0.0818923)**
-0.203651
(0.0873645)
Enterprise restructuring
1.452282
(0.1697125)***
Trade and forex system
0.8578597
(0.3182811)**
Corruption
0.0537003
(0.1096323)
Property rights freedom
-0.0146527
(0.0175292)
Tax rates
1.309064
(0.2329611)**
1.543554
(0.1479214)***
1.57272
(0.3700599)*
1.38065
(0.2207708)***
R-sq. 0.90 0.95 0.86 0.89
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
F test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observation 57 56 71 71
All models include constant variable. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***P statistically significant at 1%. **P statistically significant at 5%. *P statistically 
significant at 10%. Source: author’s calculation.
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as more FDI inflows in all SEE countries are very desirable and 
promising for relaunching/increasing production, employment, 
and export. They cannot solve the mentioned problematic areas 
for investments but with the more coherent and transparent pol-
icy (at all levels) toward potential investors they can help bridge 
the many difficulties that foreign investors are facing.
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Appendix.
Table Correlation matrix
logwages logtax~s logfdi~o loginf~n logGDPpc enterp~g tradea~m
logwages 1.0000
logtaxrates 0.0711 1.0000
logfdiinwa~o 0.6791 0.2874 1.0000
loginflation -0.2764 -0.2864 -0.2347 1.0000
logGDPpc 0.8462 0.1099 0.6789 -0.0764 1.0000
enterprise~g 0.6379 0.5411 0.7493 -0.4282 0.6814 1.0000
tradeandfo~m 0.2332 0.5179 0.4981 -0.5429 0.3125 0.7219 1.0000
corpercept~x 0.7613 0.0925 0.6651 -0.0860 0.7881 0.6065 0.2475
propertyri~m 0.1152 0.2238 0.3436 0.1514 0.5240 0.5010 0.4714
corper~x proper~m
corpercept~x 1.0000
propertyri~m 0.3479 1.0000
Source: author’s calculation.
Table Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
enterprise~g 78 2.240897 .4809276 1 3.3
tradeandfo~m 78 3.841282 .6670021 1 4.33
competitio~y 78 1.92641 .6741362 1 4
corpercept~x 62 3.316129 .5879092 2.3 4.8
propertyri~m 62 28.30645 9.621678 10 40
logGDPpc 78 8.857739 .3777053 8.064636 9.674074
loginflation 74 1.389167 .9532917 -.6979632 4.535811
logfdiinwa~o 74 7.890845 1.523312 1.548498 10.3216
logtaxrates 78 2.510367 .3233422 2.197225 2.995732
logwages 78 5.971967 .5825887 4.612443 6.960262
Source: author’s calculation.
